TR Technical Report. Initial state report for the safety assessment SR-PSU. Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. November PDF

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Technical Report TR Initial state report for the safety assessment SR-PSU Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB November 2014 Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co

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Technical Report TR Initial state report for the safety assessment SR-PSU Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB November 2014 Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co Box 250, SE Stockholm Phone ISSN SKB TR ID Updated Initial state report for the safety assessment SR-PSU Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB November 2014 A pdf version of this document can be downloaded from Update notice The original report, dated November 2014, was found to contain factual errors which have been corrected in this updated version. The corrected factual errors are presented below. Updated Location Original text Corrected text Page 42, Figure 3-4 Wrong data in figure Figure updated with correct data Page 50, last paragraph...waste type package (SKB 2013b)...waste type package (SKB 2013b, SKBdoc (Mo-93)) Page 52, table head...in the Inventory report (SKB 2013b)....in the Inventory report (SKB 2013b, SKBdoc (Mo-93)). Page 52, Table 3-16 Wrong data in table Table updated with correct data Page 53, Table 3-17 Wrong data in table Table updated with correct data Page 100, Section , second sentence...in the Inventory report (SKB 2013b)....in the Inventory report (SKB 2013b, SKBdoc (Mo-93)). Page 121, updated reference ver ver 4.0 Page 121, new reference SKBdoc ver 1.0. Ny beräkning av Mo-93 i normkolli till PSU (In Swedish.) SKB, 2015 Preface This report compiles information on the initial state of the waste and repository for the long-term safety of the low-and intermediate level waste repository SFR. It forms part of the SR-PSU safety assessment, which supports the application for a licence to extend SFR repository in Forsmark. The authors of the report are Maria Lindgren and Marie Wiborgh, Kemakta Konsult AB, and Klas Källström, SKB. The report has been reviewed by Claes Johansson, Anders Eriksson, Theresa Millqvist, SKB, Anna Pettersson, Vattenfall Research and Development AB and Ulf Brising, Sweco. Stockholm, November 2014 Fredrik Vahlund Project leader SR-PSU SKB TR Summary The final repository for short-lived radioactive waste (SFR) located in Forsmark, Sweden is currently being used for the final disposal of low- and intermediate-level operational waste from Swedish nuclear facilities. SKB plans to extend the repository to host waste from the decommissioning of the nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities. The SR-PSU assessment of the long-term safety (post-closure safety) of the whole repository is an important part of the application for a licence to build the extension. This report constitutes one of the main references supporting the Main report, which summarises the long-term safety for the SFR repository (SKB 2014e). The initial state is defined as the expected state of the repository and its environs immediately after closure. The initial state of the repository is based on verified and documented properties of the wastes and the repository components plus an assessment of changes in these properties up to the time of closure. The estimated year of closure is This report describes the following, which define and secure an appropriate initial state of SFR: Waste types. Waste packaging. Waste acceptance criteria. Design features of each waste vault. Allocation of waste packages to the waste vaults. Material quantities. Radionuclide inventories. Main dimensions of the waste vaults. Inspection and control processes. An overview of suggested measures for plugging and closure of SFR is also given. Overall, the report provides input to the assessment of the long-term safety of the SFR repository system. Finally, the expected properties and condition of each system component at repository closure are described following prescribed lists of variables (parameters). SKB TR Sammanfattning Slutförvaret för kortlivat radioaktivt avfall (SFR) i Forsmark, Sverige används för närvarande för slutlig deponering av låg- och medelaktivt driftavfall från svenska kärntekniska anläggningar. SKB planerar att bygga ut förvaret för att förvara avfall från rivning av kärnkraftverken och andra kärntekniska anläggningar. Analysen av långsiktig säkerhet SR-PSU (säkerhet efter förslutning) för hela förvaret är en viktig del av ansökan om att få bygga ut förvaret. Den här rapporten utgör en av huvudreferenserna till huvudrapporten som summerar analysen av långsiktig säkerhet för SFR (SKB 2014e). Initialtillståndet är definierat som det förväntade tillståndet för förvaret och dess omgivning direkt efter förslutning. Initialtillståndet för förvaret bygger på kontrollerade och dokumenterade egenskaper hos avfall och förvarskomponenter samt bedömning av förändrade egenskaper under tiden fram till och med förslutning. Tidpunkten för förslutning uppskattas till år För att definiera och säkerställa ett ändamålsenligt initialtillstånd för SFR beskrivs följande i rapporten: Avfallstyper. Avfallsemballage. Acceptanskriterier för avfall. Bergssalarnas design. Fördelning av avfall mellan bergssalarna. Materialmängder. Radionuklidinventar. Bergssalarnas dimensioner. Inspektions- och kontrollprocess. En översikt över föreslagna åtgärder för pluggning och förslutning av SFR ges också. Sammantaget utgör den här rapporten underlag för analysen av den långsiktiga säkerheten av SFR:s förvarssytem. Slutligen beskrivs de förväntade egenskaperna vid förslutning för varje systemkomponent i förvaret samt deras kondition med hjälp av föreskrivna listor med variabler (parametrar). 6 SKB TR-14-02 Contents 1 Introduction Background Report hierarchy in the SR-PSU safety assessment This report Initial state Reference design Overview of the report Terms and abbreviations 17 2 General considerations General Laws and regulations Repository system System components and their functions Inspection and control 21 3 Waste General basis Design considerations Waste acceptance criteria The SFR Waste acceptance criteria Waste handling manual Waste types and Waste type descriptions Waste types Waste type descriptions Handling and control of waste Handling and control at the waste producer Waste audits Handling and control in the SFR facility Waste register Future waste Waste packaging Concrete moulds Steel moulds Concrete tanks ISO-containers Tetramoulds Other packaging Waste in different parts of the repository Distribution of waste packages between the different SFR vaults BMA BMA BTF BTF Silo BLA BLA BRT Material quantities and radioactivity BMA Design Design considerations Inspection and control of 1BMA BMA dimensions and material quantities BMA Design Design considerations 63 SKB TR 5.3 Inspection and control of 2BMA BMA dimensions and material quantities BTF and 2BTF Design Design considerations Inspection and control of 1BTF and 2BTF BTF dimensions and material quantities BTF dimensions and material quantities 72 7 Silo Design Design considerations Inspection and control of the silo Silo dimensions and material quantities BLA Design Design considerations Inspection and control of 1BLA BLA dimensions and material quantities BLA Design Design considerations Inspection and control of 2 5BLA BLA dimensions and material quantities BRT Design Design considerations Inspection and control of BRT BRT dimensions and material quantities Plugs and other closure components Design Design considerations Inspection and control Dimensions and material volumes Variables for the system components Variables for the waste form Geometry Radiation intensity Temperature Hydrological variables Mechanical stresses Radionuclide inventory Material composition Water composition Gas variables Variables for the waste packaging Geometry Temperature Hydrological variables Mechanical stresses Material composition Water composition Gas variables Variables for the 1BMA and 2BMA system components Geometry Temperature SKB TR-14-02 Hydrological variables Mechanical stresses Material composition Water composition Gas variables Variables for the 1BTF and 2BTF system components Geometry Temperature Hydrological variables Mechanical stresses Material composition Water composition Gas variables Variables for the silo system components Geometry Temperature Hydrological variables Mechanical stresses Material composition Water composition Gas variables Variables for the 1BLA and 2 5BLA system components Geometry Temperature Hydrological variables Mechanical stresses Material composition Water composition Gas variables Variables for the BRT system components Geometry Temperature Hydrological variables Mechanical stresses Material composition Water composition Gas variables Variables for plugs and other closure components Geometry Temperature Hydrological variables Mechanical stresses Material composition Water composition Gas variables Summary and conclusions BMA BMA BTF BTF Silo BLA BLA BRT Plugs and other closure components 118 References 119 Appendix A Detailed information for the waste packages and waste vaults 123 SKB TR 1 Introduction 1.1 Background The SFR repository includes waste vaults underground together with buildings above ground that include a number of technical installations. The underground part is situated at about 60 metres depth in the rock and is located below the Baltic Sea. The existing facility (SFR 1) comprises five waste vaults with a disposal capacity of approximately 63,000 m 3. The extension (SFR 3 1 ) will have a disposal capacity of 108,000 m 3 in five new waste vaults plus one new vault for nine boiling water reactor pressure vessels, see Figure 1-1. The long-term post closure safety of the whole SFR has been assessed and documented in the SR-PSU Main report (SKB 2014e) with supporting documents, see Section 1.2. The Main report is part of SKB s licence application to extend and continue to operate SFR. The present report is a main reference and describes the SFR repository at the time of closure. 4BLA 5BLA 2BMA 1BRT 2BLA 3BLA 1BMA 1BLA 2BTF 1BTF Silo Figure 1-1. Schematic illustration of SFR. The grey part is the existing repository (SFR 1) and the blue part is the planned extension (SFR 3). The waste vaults in the figure are the silo for intermediate-level waste, 1 2BMA vaults for intermediate-level waste, 1 2BTF vaults for concrete tanks, 1 5BLA vaults for low-level waste and the BRT vault for reactor pressure vessels. 1 The extension is called SFR 3 since the name SFR 2 was used in a previous plan to build vaults adjacent to SFR 1 for disposal of reactor core components and internal parts. The current plan is to dispose of this waste in a separate repository. SKB TR 1.2 Report hierarchy in the SR-PSU safety assessment The applied methodology for the long-term safety comprises ten steps and is described in Chapter 2 of the PSU Main report (SKB 2014e). Several of the steps carried out in the safety assessment are described in more detail in supporting documents, so called main references that are of central importance for the conclusions and analyses in the Main report. The full titles of these reports together with the abbreviations by which they are identified in the following text together with short comments on the report contents are given in Table 1-1. There are also a large number of additional references. The additional references include documents compiled within SR-PSU, but also documents compiled outside of the project, either by SKB or equivalent organisations as well as in the scientific literature. A schematic illustration of the safety assessment documents is shown in Figure 1-2. Two important references to this Initial state report are the Inventory report (SKB 2013b) and the Closure plan for SFR (SKBdoc ), in addition to the following main references; Barrier process report (SKB 2014c), Data report (SKB 2014b), FEP report (SKB 2014d), and Waste process report (SKB 2014f). SR-PSU Main report Main references FEP report Initial state report Waste process report Barrier process report Geosphere process report Biosphere synthesis report Climate report Model summary report Data report Input data report FHA report Radionuclide transport report Additional references Figure 1 2. The hierarchy of the Main report, main references and additional references in the SR-PSU long-term safety assessment. The additional references either support the Main report or any of the main references. 12 SKB TR-14-02 Table 1 1. Main report and main references in the SR-PSU long term safety assessment. All reports are available at Abbreviation used when referenced in this report Reference Comment on content Main report Main report, Safety analysis for SFR. Long-term safety. Main report for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-01, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. Barriers process report Engineered barriers process report, Engineered barrier process report for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-04, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. Biosphere synthesis report Climate report Data report FEP report FHA report Geosphere process report Initial state report Input data report Model summary report Radionuclide transport report Waste process report Biosphere synthesis report, Biosphere synthesis report for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-06, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. Climate report, Climate and climate-related issues for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-13-05, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. Data report, Data report for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-10, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. FEP report, FEP report for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-07, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. FHA report, Handling of future human actions in the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-08, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. Geosphere process report, Geosphere process report for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-05, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. Initial state report, Initial state report for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-02, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. Input data report, Input data report for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-12, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. Model summary report, Model summary report for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-11, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. Radionuclide transport report, Radionuclide transport and dose calculations for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-09, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. Waste process report, Waste form and packaging process report for the safety assessment SR-PSU. SKB TR-14-03, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB. This document is the main report of the SR-PSU long-term post-closure safety assessment for SFR. The report is part of SKB s licence application to extend and continue to operate SFR. Describes the current scientific understanding of the processes in the engineered barriers that have been identified in the FEP processing as potentially relevant for the long-term safety of the repository. Reasons are given in the process report as to why each process is handled a particular way in the safety assessment. Describes the handling of the biosphere in the safety assessment. The report summarises site description and landscape evolution, FEP handling, exposure pathway analysis, the radionuclide model for the biosphere, included parameters, biosphere calculation cases and simulation results. Describes the current scientific understanding of climate and climate-related processes that have been identified in the FEP processing as potentially relevant for the long-term safety of the repository. The report also describes the climate cases that are analysed in the safety assessment. Qualifies data and describes how data, including uncertainties, that are used in the safety assessment are quality assured. Describes the establishment of a catalogue of features, events and processes (FEPs) that are of potential importance in assessing the longterm functioning of the repository. Describes radiological consequences of future human actions (FHA) that are analysed separately from the main scenario, which is based on the reference evolution and less probable evolutions. Describes the current scientific understanding of the processes in the geosphere that have been identified in the FEP processing as potentially relevant for the long-term safety of the repository. Reasons are given in the process report as to why each process is handled a particular way in the safety assessment. Describes the conditions (state) prevailing in SFR after closure. The initial state is based on verified and documented properties of the repository and an assessment of the evolution during the period up to closure. Describes the activities performed within the SR-PSU safety assessment and the input data used to perform these activities. Describes the calculation codes used in the assessment. Describes the radionuclide transport calculations carried out for the purpose of demonstrating fulfilment of the criterion regarding radiological risk. Describes the current scientific understanding of the processes in the waste and its packaging that have been identified in the FEP processing as potentially relevant for the long-term safety of the repository. Reasons are given in the process report as to why each process is handled in a particular way in the safety assessment. SKB TR 1.3 This report The long-term safety assessment for SFR (SR-PSU) was performed according to a developed methodology including ten steps (see Chapter 2 in the Main Report). This report is part of Step 2 Description of initial state and it details the initial state of the repository at closure. This report also describes waste acceptance criteria, reference waste inventory, repository reference design, as well as control and inspection processes used to secure an appropriate initial state of SFR. This information is an important base also for the safety report covering the construction and operation of the SFR facility Initial state The initial state is the starting point for the long-term safety assessment and provides information to several of the subsequent steps in the methodology e.g. Step 4 Description of processes through the process reports for the waste (SKB 2014f) and the engineered barriers (SKB 2014c) respectively and Step 9 Analysis of selected scenarios. The initial state of the repository part in operation (SFR 1) is based on verified and documented properties of the waste and the repository and an assessment of how these will change up to the time of closure, whereas the initial state of the extension (SFR 3) is mainly based on the reference design and present waste prognosis. The initial state of the repository environment is given in Chapter 4 of the Main report (SKB 2014e) Reference design The reference design is a design that is valid from a defined point in time until further notice. The reference design is used for technical development, further design improvements and the analyses of safety, radiation and environmental impact. The reference design for SFR 1 is mainly based on system descriptions and drawings. The reference design for the extension (SFR 3) and the long-term safety assessment for the SFR repository (SR-PSU), including this report, is based on the repository extension design defined in March 2012, Layout 1.5. However, the preparation of a licence application is an iterative and in time relatively long process and changes have therefore been made to the extension design in the time taken to compile the longterm safety assessment. Therefore, all parts of the application for the extension of SFR, except the long-term safety assessment, are based on the amended design, Layout 2.0. It is therefore important to state the differences between the two designs explicitly, which are: Height and width of 2BMA, see Table 5-1. Height of walls in 2 5BLA, see Table 9-1. Length and height of vault, dimensions of disposal area in BRT, see Table In the description given in this report, all figures are according to Layout 2.0 and d
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