European Security and Defense Policy: Between»Offensive Defense«and»Human Security« - PDF

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European Security and Defense Policy: Between»Offensive Defense«and»Human Security«STEFANIE FLECHTNER O n July 30 the European Union started its second largest military operation so far. In the Democratic

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European Security and Defense Policy: Between»Offensive Defense«and»Human Security«STEFANIE FLECHTNER O n July 30 the European Union started its second largest military operation so far. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (drc) 2,000 eu troops are to help the United Nations to maintain order and security during and after the first democratic elections in Congo since the country s independence. The drc mission is another strong signal demonstrating the eu s growing commitment to matters of international security. The European Security and Defense Policy (esdp) is already being implemented on three continents and there are a total of 11 esdp operations currently under way, involving around 9,000 soldiers and approximately 1,000 policemen and civilian experts. 1 Compared to the large-scale operations of nato and the un, these numbers may not seem all that impressive. 2 However, considering that the creation of a common European defense and security policy started only with the creation of the esdp in 1999, and that its first mission dates from merely three years ago, the extent and scope of the eu s commitment are remarkable. Furthermore esdp is one of the few areas of the European integration project that continues to grow. The creation of European Battlegroups and a European Gendarmerie force, the founding of the European Defense Agency and the creation of a civilian-military cell operating under the auspices of the eu Council are just some of the projects being currently implemented in connection with esdp. Even in the face of failed referenda and a general sentiment of crisis concerning the future of the eu, in terms of security policy Europe continues to advance. 1. Data based on the official information of the European Council at (last accessed: ). 2. The nato missions in Afghanistan (isaf) and Kosovo (kfor) alone with 9,000 and 17,500 soldiers respectively involve more forces than all eu operations put together (http://www.nato.int). The un s 15 current peace missions involve almost 90,000 persons, including over 72,000 soldiers (http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/ dpko/bnote.htm). ipg 4/2006 Flechtner, European Security and Defense Policy 157 However, the further the eu extends its security capacities and operations, the political and strategic goals of the esdp project appear vaguer. Defining these goals is an imperative if European security integration is to succeed. At the center of the European debate should be the question whether the common security policy is primarily directed at defending the European homeland or rather at securing international peace and order. ESDP A»Sui Generis«Security Project In June 1999, in Cologne, Germany, the European Council decided to»give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence«(eu Council 1999/1: 33). The European Security and Defense Policy was born. This youngest eu integration project distinguished itself through two specific characteristics: (a) in reference to its available tools, a comprehensive understanding of security policy and (b) a comparatively narrowly defined political mandate focusing on international crisis and conflict management. During the conception of the esdp project, the build-up of independent eu military capabilities was the main concern. However, from the outset the eu member states also realized the necessity of a non-military crisis reaction system and consequently a two tier structure, including military and civilian tools, was created. 3 The range of intervention capabilities, which was developed under the esdp, is unique in its ability to combine hard military and soft civilian and diplomatic means. In its diversity the eu s range of instruments far outstrips that of other international organizations, for example the osce or nato. On the other hand, the political mandate of esdp is somewhat limited. esdp s missions are laid out in the so-called»petersberg Tasks«of the Treaty of Amsterdam of These include»humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 3. esdp s civil capacities encompass around 5,000 police, around 300 specialists for establishing the rule of law (judges, lawyers, law enforcement officials), a pool of administrative experts, and various operational capabilities for disaster control (including 2,000 personnel for severe disaster relief missions). 4. This set of tasks goes back originally to the Petersberg Declaration of the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (weu) of June 19, 1992, and later on was subsumed by the eu s system of treaties. 158 Flechtner, European Security and Defense Policy ipg 4/2006 including peacemaking«(treaty of the European Union (teu) Article 17.2). The esdp project includes, according to the Treaty,»all questions relating to the security of the Union«(teu Article 17.1). However, the Treaty also emphasizes that the development of a common defense policy is only a future possibility and does not fall under the current esdp project. 5 The eu s responsibilities regarding security issues do not mirror the principle of collective defense of nato (Article V), where member states are required to assist another member state under attack by a third country. 6 Also other tasks, such as action inside the eu under the umbrella of»homeland security,«is currently not part of the esdp project. Instead, esdp is distinguished specifically by its focus on»out of area«missions. Thus esdp combines a comprehensive understanding of security, given the available resources, with a political mandate limited to the specific area of international crisis and conflict management. This particular structure and orientation distinguishes esdp from other international security regimes, as well as from the security and defense policies of its own member states. Consequently, European integration is»sui generis«also in terms of its security and defense policy. Yet what is the political and strategic rationale behind this specific approach to security?. The Lack of a Clear Political and Strategic Concept in ESDP Though the necessity of an independent European security policy is continually emphasized by the eu and its member states, the political concept behind esdp remains vague. The official arguments promoting the common security project only rarely focus on security itself. Instead, the eu tends to present esdp as an integration and foreign policy venture. The foreign policy argument runs that if the eu is to assume its role as a major player on the international stage it needs an independent security 5.»The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide.«6. In Article I-41.7 the Constitutional Treaty, passed by eu heads of state and government in June 2004 but still not ratified, foresees a mutual assistance clause which commits the member states to military assistance though not in the same way as nato or the weu. ipg 4/2006 Flechtner, European Security and Defense Policy 159 policy (eu Council 1999/1: Annex III). 7 Only the strengthening of its security and military capabilities will enable the eu to take on the role of a leading global actor as a partner with the United States or as an independent actor in a multi-polar world order. Proponents of the integration rationale believe that a common European security and defense policy is necessary to complete the Union s political integration. The integration of member states security and defense policies, which traditionally are viewed as the basis of national sovereignty, is the final missing piece to complete a truly unified eu. 8 In contrast, actual security arguments play a lesser role in the discussions surrounding esdp. This is clearly voiced in official declarations and esdp documents. For example, the Cologne declaration refers exclusively to the contractual obligation of the eu (Maastricht Treaty)»to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the un Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris, as provided for in Article 11 of the teu«(european Council 1999/1: 37). It is noteworthy that another goal of the Union laid down in the same article, namely»to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways«(teu Art. 11.1) is not mentioned in esdp s founding document. Neither the Declaration of 1999, nor any subsequent documents 9 create a direct link between the esdp integration project and the security of the Union itself. This missing step was taken only in December 2003 with the approval of the European Security Strategy (ess). ess not only analyzes risks and threats to European security, 10 but also identifies the responsibilities of the eu in that regard. According to ess»addressing the threats«to European security is a»strategic objective«of eu security policy. Thus the idea of defending European security appears for the first time as a prominent 7.»[I]n order for the eu to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the cfsp must be backed by credible operational capabilities«(european Council 1991/1, III/33). 8. See, for example, Joschka Fischer s reasoning in his policy speech»from union of states to federation thoughts on the finality of European integration«in Berlin (Fischer 2000). 9. See the declarations of the European Council from Helsinki 1999, Feira 2000 and Nice According to ess the main threats to Europe are: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state collapse and organized crime (ess 2003: 3ff). 160 Flechtner, European Security and Defense Policy ipg 4/2006 argument for esdp. At the same time, the two other strategic objectives of ess,»building security in our neighborhood«and»an international order based on effective multilateralism«reemphasize esdp s earlier commitment to international security. Thereby, ess maintains two distinct approaches to European security policy: a defense-oriented argument and, alternatively, an understanding of eu security policy underlining the commitment to international peace and order. In the European security strategy both approaches are presented as equal and independent missions. A strategic and argumentative connection of the two approaches does not exist. The civil and military capabilities of esdp are not directly associated with either one of the missions, and the role esdp capacities will play in the implementation of the new security strategy remains unclear. Consequently, ess does not provide answers to core strategic questions of the common security policy project. This is especially evident when looking at the important issue of intervention. A central demand of ess is:»we need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary, robust intervention«(ess 2003: 11). Yet, in which specific security-related cases must the eu intervene, in what way do intervention policies advance the strategic objectives of the Union and, most importantly, in which cases and under which conditions must the Union rely on hard military power? Answers to such questions ultimately depend on how the eu defines its security policy project. ess consciously avoids confronting these issues and is therefore rightly described as merely a»pre-strategic concept«(lindley-french/algieri 2004: 9). The Development of Strategic Options for ESDP The lack of clear and concise strategic and conceptual statements in the documents and declarations regarding esdp means that the European security policy project is ill-defined; it may therefore be interpreted in a variety of ways (Biscop 2005). This observation is reinforced by the development of esdp missions and capability goals. Thus, in practice, the strategic focus of European security policy has not only changed over time, but is also becoming increasingly vague with the growing number of esdp deployments. ipg 4/2006 Flechtner, European Security and Defense Policy 161 The First Phase: Comprehensive Peacekeeping à la Balkans At the time of the creation of esdp at the end of the 1990s, Europe was still under the impression of its ineptitude in dealing with the Yugoslav wars. The lessons the Europeans learned from the subsequent successful nato and un missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo did not simply bring about the project for a common European security policy, but also shaped the strategic orientation during the early stages of esdp (cf. euiss 2004: 37ff.). This is reflected in the first capability goals of esdp. In 1999, the»eu Headline Goal«envisioned the creation of the»european Rapid Reaction Force«with an eu military capacity of 60,000 soldiers that can be available for long-term interventions in a matter of 60 days (European Council 1999/2). This would move the eu s capacity for peace peacekeeping into the range of the un stabilizing mission (sfor) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 11 The creation of the civilian crisis management capacities also centered on the ability to successfully cope with long-term peace missions. The emphasis was placed in the areas of a police force and the strengthening of the local government and judicial branches (European Council 2000). The establishment of peace in the Balkans was also the initial priority of esdp operations on the ground. On January 1, 2003, the first esdp mission began in Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by four subsequent missions to the former Yugoslavia. 12 The eu Balkan missions all follow a common model for intervention: they are designed to be long-term, 13 and civil and military engagements take place in parallel or in close coordination with one another, as well as with various international actors on the ground (nato, un, osce). 11. With the 60,000 esdp soldiers envisaged in the Headline Goal, military intervention involving 20,000 soldiers for at least a year is possible (taking into consideration rotation and logistical support exigencies only around one-third of the total available troops can be deployed). At the beginning of 1996 nato s sfor mission involved 32,000 soldiers but over time this was reduced to 12,000 (www.nato.int/ sfor/index.htm). 12. The»eupm«police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ongoing since January 2003); the»concordia«military mission in Macedonia (March December 2003, completed); the»proxima«police mission in Macedonia (December 2003 December 2005, completed); the»eufor-althea«military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (since December 2004, as follow-up mission to sfor, ongoing); the»eupat«police consultant mission in Macedonia (since December 2005, ongoing). 13. Completed military missions were replaced by appropriate follow-up missions, mostly of a civil/police nature. 162 Flechtner, European Security and Defense Policy ipg 4/2006 The most important aspect of the esdp interventions in the Balkans, however, is that they are part of a comprehensive political process and are subject to a clear political strategy. Through the stabilization and association process (sap) the eu is able to provide the affected countries with a wide array of support mechanisms to institute the necessary economic, judicial, and political reforms. Still, the overall goal of the Union is the future integration of the entire region into the eu. This political perspective is not only being used as a catalyst for stabilization and transformation, 14 but it also legitimizes the eu s involvement in the Balkans in the eyes of the affected populations. The Balkans remain the most important area of interest for esdp missions and continue to take up a large part of its resources (7,000 soldiers and approximately 500 civilians). Because of the proposal of the eu to take over the un police mission in Kosovo, the political and military involvement of the eu in this region may even expand. 15 However, it is questionable whether this type of operation, which mirrors the original esdp model for interventions, will continue to dominate. In response to the terror attacks in the United States and in Spain, and the debate surrounding the war in Iraq and the European Security Strategy, a new direction for esdp, while still ill-defined, is likely to evolve. The Realignment of ESDP: More Global, Flexible, and Robust? The realignment of European security policy concerns esdp capabilities, as well as operations on the ground. Its focus is on expanding esdp to become more robust, flexible, and, most of all, more globally engaged. In February, 2003 France and Great Britain proposed for the first time the concept of European»battlegroups.«A»battlegroup,«a fighting force of approximately 1,500 soldiers, is a unit that is able to deploy rapidly for small-scale and robust fighting missions in distant regions.»artemis,«the eu military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo from June until September 2003, mirrored precisely this mission 14. As, for example, Javier Solana emphasizes in relation to esdp s eufor mission in Bosnia:»European Union engagement on the ground has been vital. But in recent years, the prospect of eventual eu membership has been the overwhelming transformational force in Bosnian politics. That has been the decisive factor«(solana 2005: 3) (see also Calic 2005). 15. On April 10, 2006 the eu Council decided to establish an eu planning team regarding a possible future eu crisis management operation in Kosovo. ipg 4/2006 Flechtner, European Security and Defense Policy 163 profile. This was the first time that the eu had intervened in an acute crisis situation. The intervention force was equipped with a robust un mandate (Security Council Resolution 1484) that allowed the approximately 1,800 esdp soldiers to use military force. Additionally,»Artemis«was the first eu mission outside Europe and the first eu military operation without the support of nato structures. Within the eu the mission was generally seen as a success 16 and may provide a good model for future eu interventions. In June, 2004 the European Council voted to support new military goals under its mission statement»headline Goal 2010«. According to this statement, esdp should encompass 13»battlegroups«by 2007 that can be deployed within 10 days for a duration of 30 days in a 6,000 kilometer radius. In addition, the new civilian headline goals point to more flexible and robust missions. Accordingly, in September 2004, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands agreed on the creation of a European Gendarmerie Force (egf). 17 With this police force designed for robust missions, the eu should be able to conduct operations in between classical military intervention and civilian missions. Future esdp initiatives are designed to encourage further integration and rapid availability of civilian structures and personnel. Consequently,»Civilian Response Teams«are to be created through which experts in various areas of crisis management can work collectively and hand-in-hand with»battlegroups«in regions of conflict (civcom 2005: 3ff). In terms of operations the realignment of esdp is evident, yet not as consistent as in terms of future capability planning. Thus, the scope and number of esdp missions has increased significantly over the past few years. In addition to the Balkans, esdp has become engaged in Georgia, the Ukraine-Moldavian border, Aceh/Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Sudan, Iraq, and in the Palestinian territories. However, robust military interventions, as in the drc, are still the exception. Instead, most missions remain low-scale civilian undertakings that vary significantly in their operational objectives. Within these new fields of engagement
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